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I trust we have not reached the point in our criminal law where
it is necessary only to accuse in order to convict .. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Fisher2 the Nebraska Supreme Court held:
[A]s a matter of law the testimony of the prosecutrix alone and
uncorroborated by any other evidence is not sufficient to sustain
a conviction for rape or assault with intent to commit rape. That
rule is applicable whether the defendant does or does not tes-
tify .... 3
The Fisher holding significantly modified the Nebraska corrobora-
tion rule to comply with the constitutional mandate that "no per-
son shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against
himself." Despite this important modification, the Court wisely
retained the essence of the corroboration rule, which was first
adopted in 1886 in Matthews v. State5 as a departure from the com-
1. Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 758, 35 N.W.2d 816, 825 (1949) (Simmons,
C.J., dissenting).
2. 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568 (1973).
3. Id. at 746-47, 212 N.W.2d at 571.
4. NEB. CONST. art. I § 12. The constitutional issue presented in Fisher
will not be discussed in this Comment. Regarding the constitutionality
of the rule, the state argued: "It is only when there is a denial by
the accused that corroboration is necessary. He has a right to testify
or not and in the case at bar he chose not to which left the victim's
testimony undisputed." State v. Fisher, 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568
(1973), Appellee's Brief at 8. The court rejected this contention say-
ing, "It is quite obvious that the application of the corroboration rule
cannot be made to depend on whether or not the defendant denies the
prosecutrix' testimony. The defendant is entitled to the presumption
of innocence." 190 Neb. at 746, 212 N.W.2d at 571.
5. The court's precise holding was:
If no marks are left upon the person or clothing (of the
prosecutrix), and no complaint is made at the first oppor-
tunity, a doubt is thrown upon the whole charge; and unless
the testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated on material
points, where the accused testifies as a witness on his own
behalf and denies the charge, the testimony of the prosecutrix
alone is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.
Matthews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 335, 27 N.W. 234, 236 (1886). The rule
was made applicable to cases of assault with intent to commit rape
in McConnell v. State, 77 Neb. 773, 110 N.W. 666 (1906).
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mon law.6 Because Nebraska decisions have adopted the so-called
unqualified corroboration rule in the absence of a legislative man-
date7 Nebraska occupies a unique position among a small minor-
6. See UNDERmLL, CxnNAL EvIDENC E § 762 (5th ed. 1957).
7. The positions of the several states may be classified into three groups:
1. Corroboration necessary for conviction:
United Statel v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Testimony of
the victim must be corroborated both as to corpus delicti and the iden-
tity of the accused-no statutory requirement). The D.C. rule is con-
siderably more stringent than the Nebraska rule; Wesley v. State, 225
Ga. 22, 165 S.E.2d, 719 (1969) (victim's testimony must be corrobo-
rated); but there is a statutory requirement, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001
(1972); See also N.Y. PINAL LAw § 130.16 (McKinney Supp. 1974)
(making New York law more stringent); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4
(1950).
2. Corroboration required in special circumstances:
Territory of Hawaii v. Hayes, 43 Hawaii 58 (1958) (victim's testimony
must be clear and convincing and supported by surrounding circum-
stances); State v. Gee, 93 Idaho 636, 470 P.2d 296 (1970) (defendant
may be convicted of statutory rape on the uncorroborated testimony
of the prosecutrix if: (1) the character of the prosecutrix for truthful-
ness remains unimpeached; (2) the character of the prosecutrix for
chastity remains unimpeached; (3) the circumstances surrounding the
offense are clearly corroborative of the prosecutrix testimony); People
v. White, 26 Ill. 2d 199, 186 N.E.2d 351 (1962) (testimony of prosecu-
trix must be clear and convincing and supported by surrounding cir-
cumstances; Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. App.
1970) (unsupported testimony of prosecutrix if not contradictory or in-
credible, or inherently improbable, may be sufficient to sustain convic-
tion of rape); State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 122 A.2d 414 (1956)
(corroboration must be probable and credible); Coward v. State, 10
Md. App. 127, 268 A.2d 508 (1970) (testimony of victim if believed,
including her positive identification of accused as perpetrator of the
crime, is sufficient to support conviction of rape); Goods v. State, 245
Miss. 391, 146 So. 2d 74 (1962) (sufficient, but should be scrutinized
with caution); State v. Gray, 423 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1968) (corroboration
of prosecutrix version of incident is not required, where evidence was
not contradictory in nature or unbelievable); Strunk v. State, 450 P.2d
216 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (conviction for rape may be had on the
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, or on slight corroboration,
where the testimony of the prosecutrix i. not inherently improbable
or unworthy of credence); Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d
523 (1963) (corroboration not required, but charge of rape must be
made out by proof clear and sufficient to satisfy the jury's mind of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Fogg v. Commonwealth,
208 Va. 541, 159 S.E.2d 616 (1968) (corroboration of the prosecutrix
in a rape case is not essential and her testimony alone is sufficient
to sustain a conviction if it is credible); State v. Jennen, 58 Wash. 2d
171, 361 P.2d 739 (1961) (corroboration of prosecutrix testimony as to
actual act of intercourse not required).
3. No corroboration necessary:
Blacknon v. State, 240 So. 2d 696 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 240
Sg. 2d 699 (Ala, 1970) (the fact that appellants' convictions rest upon
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ity of states.
This Comment will attempt to analyze and justify the Nebraska
Supreme Court's retention of the corroboration rule in cases of
rape and assault with intent to commit rape.s The analysis is
based on two broad principles. First, the state's burden of proof in
all criminal cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite
this formulation of the standard of proof, no citation is necessary
for the proposition that judicial proof is notoriously imprecise.
As an idealistic goal, then, our system should strive to inject ever-
increasing degrees of rationality into the criminal law administra-
tion. By retaining the corroboration rule, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has helped to ensure rational input upon which the fact
finder can rely in resolving factual conflicts and in determining
issues of credibility. The corroboration rule advances this goal by
imposing on the state a slightly higher burden in proving the cor-
pus delicti, if even only symbolically so.
her uncorroborated testimony is of no consequence); Bakken v. State,
489 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971) (statutory rape has no corroboration re-
quirements); State v. Dutton, 106 Ariz. 463, 478 P.2d 87 (1970) (testi-
mony of prosecuting witness alone is sufficient to support a convic-
tion); Lacy v. State, 240 Ark. 84, 398 S.W.2d 508 (1966) (testimony
of prosecutrix need not be corroborated); People v. Stevenson, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 645, 80 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1969) (the victim's testimony does not
require corroboration); Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1970)(corroboration of prosecutrix' testimony is not necessary to authorize
conviction for rape); Douglas v. State, 254 Ind. 517, 261 N.E.2d 567(1970) (uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain
the judgment of conviction); State v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 456 P.2d
830 (1969) (uncorroborated testimony is sufficient); Application of
Bennett, 77 Nev. 429, 366 P.2d 343 (1961) (testimony of prosecutrix
need not be corroborated); State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426 (Ore.
App. 1970) (rape conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutrix); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 160 N.W.2d 418 (1968) (cor-
roboration of testimony of complaining witness not essential to convic-
tion for statutory rape); Thomas v. State, 466 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (prosecutrix testimony in prosecution for assault with in-
tent to rape need not be corroborated); State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d
197, 381 P.2d 81 (1963) (testimony of prosecutrix may alone be suffi-
cient for conviction).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-408 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
Whoever shall have carnal knowledge of any other woman,
or female child, than his daughter or sister, as aforesaid,
forcibly and against her will; or if any male person, of the age
of eighteen years or upwards, shall carnally know or abuse
any female child under the age of eighteen years, with her
consent, unless such female child so known or abused is over
fifteen years of age and previously unchaste, shall be deemed
guilty of rape ....
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-409 (Reissue 1964) provides: "Whoever assaults
with intent to commit a... rape, . .. upon the person so assaulted,
,shall be imprisoned , , ,
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Second, because legal doctrines "derive meaning and content
from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the purpos-
es they were designed to serve . . .,"9 we should not be anxious to
change an established legal doctrine, unless experience has shown
that the pertinent causative circumstances no longer prevail or that
the doctrine no longer serves its intended purpose. Ostensibly, the
purpose of the corroboration rule is the prevention of injustice re-
sulting from convictions based upon unreliable evidence. An ex-
amination of Nebraska's experience with the corroboration rule
reveals that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule are still
prevalent and that the rule has been the source of little, if any,
demonstrable injustice, but instead has prevented injustice for "it is
'better that ten -guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suf-fer.,,73.
Part II of this Comment will analyze the theory of the corrobo-
ration rule. In part III Nebraska's rule is explained and in part IV
the Fisher case is used to illustrate that the need for a corrobora-
tion rule still exists.
II. ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATION
A. The Offenses
A threshold question in a case of assault with intent to commit
rape seems to be, even assuming arguendo that the corroboration
rule should apply in rape cases, why should the rule be applicable
to the lesser assault charge?" The Nebraska Supreme Court es-
tablished at an early date that sections 28-408 (defining rape) and
28-409 (proscribing assault with intent to commit rape) of
the Nebraska Revised Statutes must be read in par maateria.12
The result is that "an assault with intent to commit rape in-
cludes every essential element of the crime of rape except the
accomplishment of that crime.' 3  Thus, all the defenses to a rape
charge are available to the defendant in an assault case. Further,
the crime of assault has its own essential elements: the assault
and the requisite intent.
9. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10. W. BLACKSTONE, CoMNTARIES Book IV, ch. 27 at 358.
11. State v. Fisher, 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568 (1973), is an assault with
intent to commit rape case. The Nebraska Supreme Court offered no
theoretical justification in Fisher for the application of the rule to as-
sault cases, even though it had done so in earlier decisions not cited
by the court in Fisher.
12. Hall v. State, 40 Neb. 320, 58 N.W. 929 (1894); Davis v. State, 31 Neb.
247, 47 N.W. 854 (1891).
13. Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 754, 35 N.W.2d 816, 823 (1949).
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Assault has been defined by the Nebraska Supreme Court as
an attempt unlawfully to apply any-the least-actual force to the
person of another, directly or indirectly, without the consent of
the person assaulted ... [c]onsent on the part of the complainant
deprives the act of the character of an assault .... 14
There is, then, in cases where the lack of consent is an issue, special
reason to scrutinize the evidence closely, because consent is an
absolute defense to both crimes.1 5
The intent element must be an intent not only to have inter-
course, but also an intent to use the force necessary to accomplish
the intended sexual intrusion.'6 Intent need not be proved by di-
rect evidence, but may be established by evidence of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act. However, intent must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.17
Since the elements of the crimes of rape and assault are nearly
identical, it follows that the techniques for proving those elements
are similar. Therefore, the same circumstances that gave rise to
the corroboration rule in rape cases are also present in the assault
cases.
One of the few substantial differences between a rape conviction
and a conviction of the lesser offense of assault with intent to com-
mit rape is the severity of the possible penalty.'8 Therefore, the
only benefit obtained by dropping the corroboration rule, where
the charge is reduced from rape to assault with intent to commit
rape, is that persons convicted of the lesser charge may serve a
shorter sentence. This is true despite the fact that unreliable evi-
dence might have formed the basis of the conviction of the lesser
charge. This result would not serve the purpose of the corrobora-
tion rule-the prevention of convictions based upon unreliable evi-
dence, and, therefore, the prevention of injustice.'9 Thus, the con-
clusion is inescapable; the corroboration rule should apply to both
rape and assault cases if it is to apply at all.
B. Factors
One author has taken the following position:
14. Liebscher v. State, 69 Neb. 395, 397, 95 N.W. 870, 871 (1903).
15. Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 754, 35 N.W.2d 816, 823 (1949).
16. Id.
17. Pew v. State, 164 Neb. 735, 743, 83 N.W.2d 377, 382 (1957).
18. The rape penalty is three to fifty years imprisonment, while the pen-
alty for assault with intent to commit rape is two to fifteen years im-
prisonment. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-408 (Cum. Supp. 1974); § 28-409
(Reissue 1964).
19. Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 CoL. L. REv. 1137, 1144 (1967).
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A rape charge does have some distinctive characterisitics. The
penalties upon conviction are inordinately severe. The mere ac-
cusation, even if the prosecution is unsuccessful, may damage a
defendant's reputation and livelihood far more deeply than would
prosecution for another crime. Yet, the gravity of the offense
alone cannot justify the requirement in view of the severity of
the penalty for other crimes for which no corroboration is required.
Neither the supposed distinctiveness of rape as a crime, nor the
explicit justifications for the corroboration requirements, are
sufficient reason for a categorical rule ... precluding conviction on
the unsupported testimony of a complainant .. .20
First, this is a bootstrapping rationale. The assertion that be-
cause no formal corroboration rule attaches to the proof of other
major crimes punishable by severe penalties corroboration should
not be required in rape and assault cases is fallacious. The obvious
corollary to the above assertion is that corroboration may be needed
in other grave crimes as well. The "comparative gravity" argu-
ment cuts both ways.
Of more importance, rape and assault with intent to commit rape
are fundamentally distinctive crimes. The distinguishing consid-
erations are not the severe penalties21 and the damage to the ac-
cused's reputation. Rather, at least three factors combine to render
such charges unique.
First, the legal concept of corpus delicti is not provable in the
same way as in most other crimes. Second, consent is not only a
defense, but lack of consent is an element of rape and the lesser
assault charge. Finally, there is an isolation factor. There tend to
be no witnesses to the act, other than the prosecutrix, 22 and the fre-
quent lack of physical evidence (especially in assault cases), makes
credibility especially important in proving or disproving the charge,
because of the well-known phenomenon that "the jury's assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence is not always
rational.
'23
20. Comment, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform,
81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1384 (1972) (footnotes omitted). The Yale writer
and this writer obviously disagree on most points common to the two
articles. However, that writer and this writer do agree that the "ex-
plicit justifications" listed and discussed in the Yale article (which are
the usually cited justifications for the rule, i.e., (1) frequency of false
rape charges, (2) emotional impact on the jury, and (3) the difficulty
in disproving the charge) are not alone sufficient to justify the rule.
As will be seen in the development of this article, those "explicit justi-
fications" do not represent a complete analysis of the corroboration
rule. Rather, they are simply supporting arguments for the justifica-
tions propounded in this article.
21. See note 18 supra,
22. Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1948).
23. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocates' Analysis of Corrobo-
ration, Consent and Character, 11 Amci. CR=l. L. Rgv. 309, 310 (1973).
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1. The Corpus Delicti
Though not frequently discussed today, proof of the corpus de-
licti is essential to obtaining a conviction for any crime. Corpus
delicti is best understood by dividing it into two parts: first, a
specific loss or injury must have occurred, and second, the source of
the loss or injury must have been someone's criminality, as opposed
to an accidental loss or injury.24 It is vitally important to the opera-
tion of Nebraska's corroboration rule, that the identity of the wrong-
doer is not a component of the corpus delicti.25 The corpus delicti
must be proved by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, either by
direct or circumstantial evidence.26
In cases of murder, a person is dead; in theft, property is miss-
ing; in arson, property is burned. But in rape or assault, there may
be no tangible proof from which the corpus delicti can be inferred.
There may be medically demonstrable evidence of sexual inter-
course or penetration, but that alone does not prove the second com-
ponent of the corpus delicti-that someone's criminality was the
source of the sexual invasion. In the true27 assault cases, there will
be no medical proof of the sexual invasion. The court's conclusion
that criminality was the source of the injury must be based upon
nothing more reliable than the victim's after-the-fact report of her
self-perceived attitude toward the act; an attitude which may not
have been clear to the victim herself.28
Although at least some jurisdictions, notably the District of
Columbia, require corroboration of both the corpus delicti and the
identity of the accused, 29 Nebraska's corroboration rule applies only
to the corpus delicti. The Nebraska Supreme Court made it clear in
24. Henn v. State, 172 Neb. 597, 601, 111 N.W2d 385, 388 (1961). See also
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK OF CRMINAL LAW, 18, 19 (1972); 7
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2072 (3d ed. 1940).
25. See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
26. Id.
27. "True" assault with intent to commit rape is used to mean those cases
where the event consisted solely of the assault with the requisite in-
tent, as opposed to those cases where the charge is reduced by the
prosecution from rape to assault for whatever reason, but where the
act was consummated.
28. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Opera-
tion and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 58, 65
(1952); AmIR, PATERNS IN FoRcIBLE RAPE, 259-276 (1971).
29. This fact is what makes Nebraska's rule considerably less stringent
than the rule followed in the District of Columbia. United States v.
Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (testimony of the victim must
be corroborated both as to corpus delicti and the identity of the ac-
cused).
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Noonan v. State 0 that the prosecutrix' identification of the ac-
cused as her attacker need not be corroborated. The Noonan court's
rationale is instructive.
[W]here the corpus delicti involved in a charge of assault with in-
tent to commit rape, robbery, murder, or with intent to do great
bodily harm has been fully established . . . , a woman's evidence
is entitled to receive the same consideration from our tribunals
as that to which the evidence of a man under like circumstances is
entitled.... [T]he contention as to the necessity of corroboration
of the prosecutrix' evidence . . . connecting the defendant with
the offense, is disapproved. 31
Even under the Nebraska rule, however, the state is required to
prove with corroboration, as part of the corpus delicti, that a crime
was committed by someone before the case can go to the jury.
This is readily inferable from the court's holding in Fisher. "[A] s
a matter of law the testimony of the prosecutrix alone and uncor-
roborated by any other evidence is not sufficient to sustain a con-
viction for rape or assault with intent to commit rape."32
The Nebraska Supreme Court has deliberately chosen to require
a more rigorous standard of proof concerning the corpus delicti in
cases of rape or assault. By raising the state's burden of proof with
respect to the corpus delicti, the court has declared its intention to
inject greater rationality into such cases. But this alone does not
sufficiently justify the corroboration rule.
2. Consent
Consent bears directly on the need for a corroboration rule in
rape and assault cases in at least two different ways. First, the
lack of consent is an element of the corpus delicti of rape or the
lesser included assault charge. Further, the consent element of such
crimes is one of the most subjective, and therefore, irrational,
aspects of the proof of either crime. It is precisely because of the
subjectivity involved in the proof of non-consent that a corrobora-
tion rule is particularly justifiable.
It should be clear that if the state cannot prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the prosecutrix did not consent, then neither a rape
nor an assault charge can be maintained. If the prosecutrix consent
ed, an act that would otherwise constitute a rape or an assault loses
30. 117 Neb. 520, 221 N.W. 434 (1928) (assault with intent to commit
rape); cf. Wade v. Hicks, 191 Neb. 847, 849, - N.W.2d -, - (1974)
(reaffirming Noonan and applying the rape corroboration rule in a pa-
ternity suit).
31. Id. at 525, 221 N.W. at 436.
32. 190 Neb. at 746-47, 212 N.W.2d at 571.
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that characterization. 3
Consent must continue to be of primary importance because it is
the heart of the proscriptions involved. What is protected through
rape and assault laws is not simply a person's integrity from vio-
lent or wrongful invasions by other persons, although certainly
that is one of the more important effects of such laws, The es-
sence of such criminal (and tort) laws is the protection of the per-
sonal, bodily integrity of females-not only from unlawful invasions,
but specifically from non-consensual invasions. 4
The consent standard, however, is a major source of the irration-
ality surrounding prosecutions of rape or assault charges. The ir-
rationality addressed by this point is not that of the fact finder,
'but that of the prosecutrix herself. In many cases her irrationality,
that is, her subjective evaluation of the event is merely adopted by
the fact finder if the fact finder determines the prosecutrix' testi-
mony to be credible. Thus, regardless of the resolution of the con-
sent issue, credibility (because it is the basis for determining con-
sent) is the crux of the problem.35
The consent standard is a source of irrationality, because in
some cases, from the psychological point of view, the prosecutrix'
conscious response to the sexual demands of her alleged attacker
may not accurately be labelled as either consensual or non-consen-
sual. In cases of sudden sexual attack by unknown persons, it may
be reasonable to assume the victim's response would have been
opposition. However, where participants in the alleged rape or
assault were previously acquainted, possibly to the point of a dating
relationship, then it seems neither reasonable nor fair to assume
conclusively that the female's response was one of non-consent and
actual opposition.
Because the prosecutrix' self-perceived attitude may not have
been clear even to herself, the fact finder must rely on her be-
havior. Although more reliable than an after-the-fact asser-
tion of a self-perceived attitude, behavior is also unreliable because
it may be ambiguous or even inconsistent with the actor's subjec-
tive attitude.3 6 Adding to the unreliability of behavior as a mani-
33. Liebscher v. State, 69 Neb. 395, 397, 95 N.W. 870, 871 (1903); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28-408 (Cum. Supp. 1974); cf. State v. Campbell, 190 Neb. 22,
25, 206 N.W.2d 53, 56 (1973).
34. It is true that in rape and the assault situations, invasion is unlawful
because it is non-consensual. Consensual sexual "invasions," however,
may also be unlawful. See, e.g., NEB. Rv. ,STAT. §§ 28-902 (adultery),
28-928 (fornication) (Reissue 1964).
35. Supra note 23, at 322.
36. Comment, supra note 28, at 65-70.
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festation of an attitude is the "consent standard" itself. "It is only
required that the female make reasonable resistance in good faith
under all the circumstances and that the resistance be such as to
make non-consent and actual opposition genuine and real."37
The potentially prejudicial effects of the prosecutrix' possibly un-
reliable behavior would be mitigated if the prosecutrix accurately
recalls and reports her true attitude. The individual's psychological
processes, however, frequently alter the content of one's percep-
tions. Thus,
the woman's recall will often be tailored to fit personality needs
which become dominant after the act. The stronger these needs
and the more ambivalent the original attitude, the greater is the
subsequent distortion .... Particularly since most reports are
made to parents, police, or prosecutors, the woman is likely to
recall her attitude as one of opposition. 38
The problem of unreliable reports is accentuated by the tech-
niques used by untrained interviewers, (a group including most
parents and police); particularly when the victim is subject to
emotional trauma resulting from a sexual attack.39
Just as dangerous to the accused as involuntarily distorted re-
call is the frequent incidence of deliberate false accusation. Report-
ed cases reveal a substantial number of motives behind false ac-
cusations. 40 While in most situations sophisticated investigative
methods would probably reveal false accusations,41 the person ac-
cused of assault in cases where he was with the prosecutrix at the
time of the alleged crime and, therefore, had the opportunity to
commit an assault, usually will not be in a position to benefit from
this investigation. Since proof of penetration is not required and
frequently physical evidence of an assault is absent, an innocent
person may find it difficult to meet the false charge.
Such cases become nothing more than swearing contests,42
leaving the fact-finder no rational way to resolve the conflict.
The corroboration rule automatically resolves the conflict in favor
37. State v. Campbell, 190 Neb. 22, 25, 206 N.W.2d 53, 56 (1973).
38. MACDONALD, RAPE: OFFENDERs' AD THEIR VicTniVs, 236 (1971).
39. See KINsEY, et al., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUmAN MALE, 35-62
(1949); cf. Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist
View, 11 Am. CRnw. L. REV. 335 (1973).
40. See e.g., Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 154 S.W. 969 (1913); State v.
Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923); Allen v. State, 134 P. 91 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1913); Martinez v. State, 59 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933);
Shock v. State, 200 Ind. 469, 164 N.E. 625 (1929); State v. Anderson,
272 Minn. 384, 137 N.W.2d 781 (1965); see also MAcDoNALD, supra, note
38 at 210-11.
41. Supra note 20 at 1375.
42. Supra note 19 at 1139.
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of the accused.43 Since it is true that a charge of rape or assault
is not necessarily untrue simply because it cannot be corroborated,
the social cost of this decision is that some guilty persons are
freed 4 4 But making convictions easier to obtain, enhances the risk
of convicting innocent persons. It is submitted that this social cost
is too high.
3. The Isolation Factor
The crimes of rape and assault with intent to commit rape are
usually committed in an "isolated" setting. That is, the nature
of these crimes is such that eyewitnesses, other than the prose-
cutrix and the accused, are seldom available.45 This fact, coupled
with the frequent lack of physical evidence (especially in assault
cases), adds to the crucial importance of credibility in proving or
disproving the charges.
Charges of rape and assault are uniquely difficult to defend be-
cause of this factor. The truth of this assertion was recognized
by Lord Hale in seventeenth century.
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought se-
verely and impartially be punished with death; but it must be
remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent .... 46
Lord Hale's observation concerning the difficulty of defending
a rape charge is even more applicable to defending an assault
charge. At least in rape cases there will usually be some physical
evidence of the crime-if nothing more than signs of penetration
(discoverable through a medical examination conducted after the
alleged invasion) or torn clothing. But in assault cases, there may
be no physical evidence.
Thus the difficulty in presenting affirmative evidence in favor
of the defendant may be even greater for the man charged with
assault than for the man charged with rape. There would, most
likely, be no physical evidence, unless the assault was truly an act
of violence in the common meaning of the term. But the vio-
lence necessary to fulfill that element of an assault may be min-
imal, leaving no marks whatsoever. Thus, "the adversary trial
on which our law relies so heavily to expose untruth is likely to
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1141.
45. Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1948).
46. M. HALE, PLEAS OF Tru CuowN 635 (1680).
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produce, in [such] cases, nothing more than two conflicting stories,
both told under oath,"47 if both stories are told at all.
48
C. The Role of the Court
Finally, it has been argued that a corroboration rule is un-
necessary because of the power of the judge "to set aside or di-
rect a verdict based on insubstantial evidence," 49 thereby serving
the same purposes as are served by the corroboration rule. But,
at least in Nebraska, the power of the judge to set aside or direct
a verdict based on insubstantial evidence would not effectively
serve the same purposes.
In Nebraska, the verdict of the jury cannot be set aside, unless
the verdict is clearly wrong.50 In further recognition of the role of
the jury as "the judges of the credibility of the witnesses who
testify before them and of the weight of their testimony,"5' 1 not
even the Nebraska Supreme Court will "'interfere with a verdict of
guilty, based upon conflicting evidence, unless it is so lacking in
probative force that..., as a matter of law, it is insufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... "52
The only situations justifying a trial court's direction of a not
guilty verdict are "when there is a total failure of proof . . . to
support a material allegation in the information, or where the testi-
mony adduced is of so weak or doubtful a character that a convic-
tion based thereon could not be sustained. ... 2153
It should be clear that while the power of the trial judge to
set aside or direct a verdict is intended to serve the same purposes
as the corroboration rule, the Nebraska trial judge's power in this
respect is severely restricted. The corroboration rule is a better
vehicle to prevent convictions based upon unreliable evidence. Fur-
ther, as the Fisher 54 case demonstrates, trial judges, as well as
juries, may be susceptible to the irrationality which may be in-
jected into cases of rape or asault.5 5
47. Supra note 19 at 1139.
48. In Fisher only one story was told. The defense relied on its plea of
not guilty, which under Nebraska law is equal to an unequivocal de-
nial. See State v. Fisher, 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568, 571 (1973).
49. See note 20 supra at 1385.
50. Sherrick v. State, 157 Neb. 623, 638, 61 N.W.2d 358, 369 (1953).
51. Id., quoting Morrow v. State, 146 Neb. 601, 20 N.W.2d 602 (1945).
52. Id., quoting Haines v. State, 135 Neb. 433, 281 N.W. 860 (1938).
53. Id. at 638, 61 N.W.2d at 369 (emphasis added), reaffirmed, State v. At-
kinson, 190 Neb. 473, 476,- N.W.2d-,- (1973).
54. See part IV infra.
55. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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Ill. THE NEBRASKA EXPERIENCE
Since the ostensible purpose of the Nebraska corroboration rule
is the prevention of injustice by precluding convictions based upon
unreliable evidence, a brief examination of the Nebraska experience
with the corroboration rule is necessary to understand the opera-
tion of the rule and to determine whether it should be retained. If
it appears that the pertinent causative circumstances still prevail, or
that the rule continues to serve its original purpose, then it should
be retained. If not, then serious doubt is cast upon the desirability
of retaining the rule.
Initially, it must be determined what must be corroborated. The
Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently held that
it is not essential ... that the prosecutrix be corroborated by other
evidence as to the principal act constituting the offense but it is
indispensable that she be corroborated as to material facts and
circumstances which tend to support her testimony as to the princi-
pal fact in issue .... 56
Above all, it should be noted that the Nebraska corroboration rule
has never required a witness, other than the prosecutrix, to the
principal act.
One year after the corroboration rule was adopted, an attempt
was made to construe the rule to require a witness in addition to
the prosecutrix as to the prinicipal act. But the Supreme Court
held:
We do not understand the rule in such cases to require corrobora-
ting testimony to the positive fact of the rape. If such were re-
quired, convictions could seldom be had, even in the most flagrant
cases. Men engaged in the commission of offenses of this kind sel-
dom call witnesses to the fact or attack women who are not alone
and within their power.57
This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1972 in State v. Ferg-
uson.58
In Ferguson, there was no mectical testimony, because the po-
lice failed to request a medical examination. The prosecutrix
made a prompt complaint and was able to identify the defendant's
photograph from a collection of two hundred photographs. The
prompt complaint (made almost immediately upon returning
56. Pew v. State, 164 Neb. 735, 742, 83 N.W.2d 377, 381 (1957) (emphasis
added). The distinction between the "principal act constituting the
offense" and the "principal fact in issue' is crucial. The principal act
in rape cases is the sexual intrusion, and in assault with intent to com-
mit rape cases, it is the application of force. The principal fact in issue
is the commission of the crime by the defendant.
57. Fager v. State, 22 Neb. 332, 333, 35. N.W. 195, 196 (1887) (statutory
rape).
58. 188 Neb. 330, 334, 196 N.W.2d 374, 376 (1972) (forcible rape).
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home), although not alone sufficient, was held to be a proper sub-
ject for the jury's consideration as corroborative evidence. 59
If the prosecutrix' complaint is to be admissible as effective
corroboration, it must be made voluntarily and within a reasonable
time after the attack. In Sherrick v. State6 ° the prosecutrix' com-
plaint was held to be inadmissible because it was not made until af-
ter school on the day following the alleged rape and in response to
direct questioning by the fourteen year old prosecutrix' mother.
But a response to a simple question by a stranger does not render
such a complaint involuntary.61 Complaints made to a stranger
minutes after the attack, followed by a complaint to the girl's
roommate, and to police officials the same night and again the
next morning have been held to be timely62 for purposes of cor-
roborative effect and admissibility.
In Larson v. State65 the defendant was convicted of statutory
rape, even though the prosecutrix testified that the defendant
forcibly committed the offense without her consent. The supreme
court reversed on the ground that the evidence did not support the
conviction. The defendant was a cripple. There were other people
in the house at the time of the alleged offense, yet the girl made no
outcry, and no complaint was made to the authorities until eight
months after the alleged offense, even though the girl allegedly told
her mother the day following the attack. Finally, the girl drove
the defendant, her brother-in-law, 'home after the alleged offense.
Certainly these facts lead to an inference of less-than-good-faith
prosecution.
The Larson case provided the court with the vehicle for an-
nouncing another important principle. It was argued on appeal that
despite all the doubtful aspects of the case, the conviction should
stand because the defendant had the opportunity to commit the of-
fense. But the supreme court held, "[A] moment's reflection will
convince a reasonable person that opportunity alone is not corrobo-
ration. '6 4 Where the opportunity to commit the crime is clearly
established, however, evidence substantially showing an intention
or disposition on the part of the defendant to conunit the crime is
sufficient corroboration.6 5
59. Id.
60. 157 Neb. 623, 630-31, 61 N.W.2d 358, 365 (1953) (statutory rape).
61. State v. Campbell, 190 Neb. 22, 24, 206 N.W.2d 53 (1973) (forcible
rape).
62. Id. at 24-25, 206 N.W.2d at 56.
63. 110 Neb. 620, 194 N.W. 684 (1923) (statutory rape).
64. Id. at 624, 194 N.W. at 685 (emphasis added).
65. Disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime has been
inferred from: defendant's statements to other persons and to the
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The defendant's behavior upon the approach or arrival of law
enforcement officers has been recognized as a fact which may be
considered as a corroborating circumstance in a particular case.
Flight, although ambiguous in itself, may be coupled with other
circumstances to constitute corroboration. 66 In State v. Gero67
the defendant was found nude, lying on the prosecutrix' blood-
soaked bed, and fled the scene. In State v. Ferguson,6 the po-
lice found the defendant hiding under the floor of his home the
morning following the offense. Again, there were other identifying
factors. It is at least arguable that flight, standing alone, should
not be corroborative of anything in particular. But facts do not
exist in isolation, and the totality of circumstances of each case will
be dispositive.
The prosecutrix' subsequent pregnancy could provide sufficient
corroboration. In Livinghouse v. State,69 however, the fact of the
pregnancy led to the reversal of the conviction. In Livinghouse
the prosecutrix testified that defendant committed the act in
prosecutrix' bed, while the prosecutrix' sister slept quietly on the
other side of the same bed. The sister had no personal knowledge
of the activity. Further, the baby was born fifty days short of full
term, assuming conception resulted from the alleged offense. There
was no evidence of a premature birth, but there was evidence that
the prosecutrix had been away from home for two months prior to
the date of the alleged offense.70 The supreme court reversed the
jury conviction for lack of corroboration.
In Richards v. State71 the prosecutrix did not bring a complaint
to the authorities until she was seven months pregnant. The de-
prosecutrix at or near the time of the commission of the offense, Daw-
son v. State, 96 Neb. 777, 779, 148 N.W. 957, 958 (1914) (assault with
intent to commit rape); bruises inflicted on the prosecutrix, a torn
slip strap, and statements to the prosecutrix, Pew v. State, 164 Neb.
735, 743, 83 N.W.2d 377, 382 (1957) (assault with intent to commit
rape); the testimony of persons other than the prosecutrix indicating
that the prosecutrix frequented defendant's trailer, he gave her food,
loaned her small amounts of money, showed her lewd pictures, made
indecent exposures of his body at or near the time of the offense, and
bought the prosecutrix some new clothes the day after the alleged of-
fense, Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1948)(statutory rape). It must be emphasized that disposition and oppor-
tunity must conjoin in order to serve as corroboration.
66. State v. Gero, 184 Neb. 107, 110, 165 N.W.2d 371, 373 (1969) (forcible
rape).
67. Id.
68. State v. Ferguson, 188 Neb. 330, 333, 196 N.W.2d 374, 376 (1972).
69. 76 Neb. 491, 107 N.W. 854 (1906 (statutory rape).
70. Id. at 495, 107 N.W. at 855.
71. 36 Neb. 17, 53 N.W. 1027 (1893) (forcible rape) (reversed on other
grounds-jury misconduct).
108 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 1 (1975)
fendant admitted sexual intercourse, but denied force. There was
nothing in the case to corroborate the prosecutrix' claim of lack
of consent, but because defendant admitted intercourse and had
driven the girl far out into the country to commit the alleged of-
fense, the court held the question was proper for the jury.
Other factors which have been accepted as sufficient corro-
boration in Nebraska are: admissions of defendant or co-defend-
ants;7 2 injuries to the prosecutrix' body; 73 torn clothing;7 4 and
shattered nervous condition of the prosecutrix immediately follow-
ing the alleged attack.75
The Nebraska corroboration rule is unqualified in the sense
that all charges of assault with intent to commit rape, statutory
rape, or forcible rape must be corroborated to sustain a conviction.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has deliberately chosen to make
its corroboration rule applicable in all such cases. Unvarying
across the board applicability seems considerably more desir-
able than a rule requiring ad hoc determinations such as: whether
the prosecutrix' testimony is clear and convincing;76 or whether the
prosecutrix' testimony is not contradictory, incredible, or inherently
improbable.77
A rule designed to prevent injustice to a class of criminal de-
fendants must operate in favor of all members of the class. Were
it otherwise, the rule would tend to contravene its purpose through
uneven application. Further, were the corroboration rule not ap-
plicable in all cases, then the parties would be compelled to litigate
additional issues which would introduce risks ranging from "induc-
ing decision[s] on a purely emotional basis, at one extreme, to
nothing more harmful than merely wasting time, at the other ex-
treme, ' 78 into trials already inherently fraught with risks not pres-
ent in other trials.
It should be clear, that while the Nebraska corroboration rule is
applied without qualification, it is certainly not a difficult rule to
satisfy. A showing of opportunity and inclination is sufficient. 79
Apparently, nothing more than the prosecutrix' assertion of sexual
72. Miller v. State, 169 Neb. 737, 100 N.W.2d 876 (1960); Frank v. State,
150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816 (1949).
73. Matthews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W. 234 (1886).
74. Lewis v. State, 115 Neb. 659, 214 N.W. 302 (1927).
75. Wheeler v. State, 106 Neb. 808, 184 N.W. 883 (1921).
76. People v. White, 26 Ill. 2d 199, 186 N.E.2d 351 (1962).
77. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). See
also UNDERHIL, CRImINAL EVIDENCE 1753 (5th ed. 1957).
78. See generally NEB. PRop. RULsS Ev., Comment to Rule 403 (1973).
79. Pew v. State, 164 Neb. 735, 83 N.W.2d 377 (1957).
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intrusion is necessary to prove the intrusion, 80 and the identity of
the accused need not be corroborated.81 Finally, circumstantial
evidence is admissible as corroborative evidence. Diligent prosecu-
tors should clearly be able to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy
the Nebraska rule's requirements, in most, if not all, cases.
IV. THE FISHER CASE
State v. Fisher8 2 demonstrates that the considerations which led
to the adoption of the corroboration rule still prevail and that the
rule continues to serve its purpose. Fisher illustrates the classic
situation where mere accusation could be sufficient proof for convic-
tion. The case was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, and
the only evidence presented was the prosecutrix' testimony.
The prosecutrix was eighteen years old, single, employed, and
lived in a rented room in a private home in Gordon, Nebraska.
The girl was alone in her unlocked house, asleep in her bedroom.
About 1:30 a.m. she awoke and found the defendant standing in her
room. He inquired as to the whereabouts of his wife, a good friend
of the prosecutrix, and after she answered his question, they visited
for a few minutes. The defendant, who had been drinking, then
left the house. The prosecutrix stayed in bed and did not lock the
front door, although the other residents of the house had keys.
After fifteen or twenty minutes, the defendant returned to the
house, went to the prosecutrix' bedroom, sat down on her bed,
and began a conversation with her about "the past." They had
known each other for several years, having dated in junior high
school. The prosecutrix did not protest the defendant's presence
and did not tell him to leave until well into their second conversa-
tion. Eventually, the defendant put his arm around her and an-
nounced that he was going to rape her. A struggle ensued on the
bed, the girl escaped into the living room, only to be caught by
the defendant, but she escaped to a nearby house. This was the
evidence against the defendant.8 3  The defendant unequivocally
denied her story through his not guilty plea.
Thus, the trial court was faced with the responsibility of making
a choice between believing sworn testimony, on one hand, and an
unequivocal denial on the other. The trial court convicted the de-
fendant on the charge of assault with intent to commit rape. The
supreme court reversed for lack of corroboration.
80. State v. Ferguson, 188 Neb. 330, 196 N.W.2d 374 (1972).
81. Noonan v. State, 117 Neb. 520, 221 N.W. 434 (1928).
82. 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d 568 (1973).
83. Id. at 743, 212 N.W.2d at 569; Brief for Appellant at 3-4. For an inter-
esting line of questioning, see Brief for Appellee at 3-8.
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The record indicated neither physical evidence of an assault,
nor timely complaint, and the circumstances revealed in the prose-
cutrix' testimony created a reasonable doubt. It must be remem-
bered, however, this does not mean that there could not have been
sufficient corroborative evidence available, but simply that none
was presented. Nor is it intended to imply that the assault charge
was not true, but simply that it was not proved.
V. CONCLUSION
The record of the Fisher case contains all three factors discussed
above as justifications for retaining the corroboration rule. The
distinctive corpus delicti, of course, was a part of the case, as in all
such cases. Concerning the consent issue, the trier of fact simply
adopted the prosecutrix' after-the-fact report of her self-perceived
attitude toward the event as proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
non-consent. Where only one person testifies, it would appear likely
that that person's testimony would be considered credible by the
trier of fact in most cases. To determine a factual issue on such a
basis would obviously favor the state in criminal cases where the
defendant exercises his constitutional right to remain silent. Finally,
only two people participated in or witnessed the events which gave
rise to the criminal charge.
Admittedly, the Fisher case is only one case. However, in view
of the additional fact that the case was tried to the court without
a jury, it can reasonably be speculated that ad hoc trial court de-
terminations of the sufficiency of the evidence, coupled with the
Nebraska law on the power of trial judges,8 4 would not be an effec-
tive safeguard. The corroboration rule is a "blunderbuss ap-
proach,"8 5 but seems preferable to the alternatives. In operation,
the corroboration rule "does not make inevitable the escape of the
innocent, and it makes less likely the punishment of the guilty.18 6
Finally, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rests on
the State-few would want it otherwise. By retaining the cor-
roboration rule, the Nebraska Supreme Court continued a laudable
tradition of seeking to protect individual liberty by preventing con-
victions based on unreliable evidence and injecting greater ration-
ality into the criminal process.
Alan G. Gless '75*
84. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
85. Supra note 20, at 1384.
86. Supra note 19, at 1148.
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